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Act (FLSA) to provide protections for some women to express milk at work. 2
Section 4207 borrows concepts from existing labor standards and employment
discrimination laws to offer job-protected break time and space-related
accommodations for breastfeeding purposes. These protections are designed to
achieve public health goals and are therefore different than prior federal
employment laws.
Rather than establish labor standards or antidiscrimination protection for all
workers with caregiving or other personal needs, Congress created protections
for a relatively small subgroup of individuals: non-exempt working women who
choose to express milk for children under the age of one. 3 In so doing, the
PPACA promotes specific behavior (breastfeeding) by offering workplace
protections to a subset of workers (low-income mothers 4) for
health-based reasons. Essentially, the law is intended to encourage low-income
women to breastfeed, rather than to address historical discrimination or barriers
to employment for this group of workers or working mothers generally.
Nonetheless, the PPACA has antidiscrimination implications.
The use of employment law to promote public health is not novel, but the
decision to place breastfeeding protections in this framework must be considered
within the larger context of employment law. In its examination of this new law,
this Article places section 4207 in the broader civil rights context and builds
upon scholarship that argues that the physical space and structure of the
workplace have perpetuated discrimination against women and people with
The Article also contributes to the discussion of the
disabilities. 5
interdisciplinary nature of employment law by asserting that section 4207
2. Id. § 4207 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (Supp. V 2012)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1). A “non-exempt” employee is entitled to certain protections under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), such as a guaranteed minimum wage and overtime pay. See
infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
4. See BRANDON ROBERTS, ET AL., THE WORKING POOR FAMILIES PROJECT, LOW INCOME
WORKING FAMILIES: THE GROWING ECONOMIC GAP 2 (Winter 2012-2013), available at
http://www.workingpoorfamilies.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Winter-2012_2013-WPFPData-Brief.pdf (defining “low-income” as earning less than 200% of the poverty threshold); see
also Federal Poverty Guidelines, Families USA (Feb. 2014), http://familiesusa
.org/product/federal-poverty-guidelines (comparing the 2014 and 2013 federal poverty guidelines);
Workplace Flexibility 2010 & Urban Institute, Lower-Wage Workers and Flexible Work
Arrangements 1–3, http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/Lower-Wage%20Workers
%20and%20FWAs.pdf (describing different definitions that capture the “low-income” workers
population). See infra notes 112–118 and accompanying text (explaining how the law is limited
by class even though it does not explicitly state that it is limited to “low-income mothers”).
5. See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability Paradigm of
Sex Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2008) (discussing the theory that physical
space promotes discrimination against people with disabilities and members of other protected
groups); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1044 & n.11
(2004) (arguing that the physical structure of a building may discriminate against people with
disabilities).
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represents a new approach to employment law: promoting social and economic
equity in the workplace while simultaneously encouraging breastfeeding among
low-income, working mothers by making it possible for them to do so at work. 6
The PPACA provides an ideal opportunity to examine how legislation aimed
to achieve goals outside the civil rights context may still nonetheless effectively
address historical discrimination and societal oppression. The employment
provisions of this new law represent a shift away from traditional labor standards
designed to improve employment conditions for all workers and traditional
employment discrimination provisions used to address historic discrimination
toward regulating the workplace for a public health purpose directed only at a
small group of people. Admittedly, this law may not be the dawning of a new
frontier. However, its unique combination of protections and its focus on one
particular class of workers facilitates the consideration of whether the
government should enact workplace legislation to promote healthcare-based
conduct. This Article considers, and ultimately rejects, the incorporation of
limited employment rights that place symbolic requirements—without more—
on employers for a public health purpose.
Part I discusses the legislative history of the PPACA, focusing on the
government’s continued support for breastfeeding and the barriers facing
women who want to breastfeed and retain employment, specifically low-income
women. Part II describes the relevant provisions in the PPACA and analyzes
the provisions’ break time allowance and designation requirements for a location
to express milk, the law’s enforcement options, the Department of Labor’s
clarification of the law, and the case law interpreting the provisions thus far.
Part III theorizes that these provisions represent a new combination of traditional
labor standards and accommodations to address employment barriers to lowincome, working women who choose to breastfeed in their newborns’ first year
of life. Finally, Part IV rejects this type of piecemeal approach to employment
law.

6. See generally., Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1963 (2013) (noting the use of other types of legislation to achieve the traditional goals of
employment law).
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I. BREASTFEEDING AT WORK BEFORE THE PPACA
A. Breastfeeding Benefits and Medical Recommendations
The benefits of breastfeeding are no longer in dispute and are well
documented elsewhere. 7 Breastfeeding has recognized nutritional, 8 physical, 9
physiological, 10 and psychological 11 benefits for nursing women. Similarly,

7. See, e.g., OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
YOUR GUIDE TO BREAST FEEDING 4 (2011), available at http://www.womenshealth
.gov/publications/our-publications/breastfeeding-guide/BreastfeedingGuide-General-English.pdf
(describing the benefits breastfeeding offers to children). Discussion of formula is outside the
scope of this paper.
8. American Academy of Pediatrics, Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk, 115
PEDIATRICS e827, e827 (2012), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content
/115/2/496.full.pdf+html (discussing the nutritional value of breast milk).
9. Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring Employer
Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 266–67 (2002) (observing
that physical benefits to breastfeeding mothers include a lower risk of breast, uterine, and ovarian
cancers; an easier ability to “expel the placenta after birth;” and a decreased chance of diabetes or
a “delay in the onset of subsequent diabetes for the gestational diabetic”); Heather M. Kolinsky,
Respecting Working Mothers With Infant Children: The Need for Increased Federal Intervention
to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 333, 338 (2010) (noting that physical benefits to breastfeeding mothers include lower
blood sugar over time); Matthew L. Williams, Note, Let ‘Em Work, Let ‘Em Nurse:
Accommodation for Breastfeeding Employees in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 1017,
1020 (2009) (noting that physical benefits to breastfeeding mothers include faster loss of pregnancy
weight, reduction in postpartum bleeding and anemia, and reduction in bone loss and chance of
post-menopausal hip fractures and osteoporosis).
10. Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 471, 477 (2001) (stating that the physiological benefits of breastfeeding “include
greater bonding between the mother and child, greater confidence in parenting skills, and an
increase in self-esteem related to the attainment of those parenting skills”); see also Williams, supra
note 9, at 1020.
11. Gardner, supra note 9, at 267–68 (explaining that the psychological benefits of
breastfeeding include “increased self-confidence and accelerated bonding between the mother and
her infant”).
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breastfed children also experience a range of health benefits. 12 Together, these
benefits improve public health and result in significant health care savings. 13
Further, breastfeeding is a free source of food and nutrition, which results in
significant savings for individual mothers and families. 14
Increased
breastfeeding in certain populations may also result in financial savings for the
government. For example, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants and Children (WIC) provides free formula to low-income
women. 15 In fiscal year 2009, WIC spent $850 million to provide this formula. 16
Thus, the government also has a financial interest in promoting breastfeeding
because encouraging new mothers to breastfeed might reduce this cost.
12. Henry Wyatt Christup, Litigating a Breastfeeding and Employment Case in the New
Millennium, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263, 263 (2000) (noting that breastfed children experience
lower rates of “bacterial infections, botulism, diarrhea, respiratory illnesses, viral infection,
allergies, and sudden infant death syndrome”); Gardner, supra note 9, at 268–69 (reporting that
breastfed children may contract fewer ear and urinary tract infections); Kolinsky, supra note 9, at
337–38 (same); Williams, supra note 9, at 1020 (same). As breastfed children age, they are less
likely to get diabetes, be overweight, or contract certain cancers. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 338;
Williams, supra note 9, at 1020. Breastfed children also experience shorter duration and decreased
severity of illnesses, should they occur. Gardner, supra note 9, at 270–71; Kolinsky, supra note 9,
at 337–38. For example, breastfed babies under the age of one are less likely to die of Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome. Gardner, supra note 9, at 269–70; Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 337–38;
Williams, supra note 9, at 1020. Finally, breastfeeding has been connected to higher cognitive
development, better sight, and quicker speech development. Christup, supra, at 265; Maureen E.
Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, Gender, and Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 875, 888 (2005).
13. See U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS TO SUPPORT AND
PROTECT BREASTFEEDING 3 (2010), available at http://www.usbreastfeeding.org
/Portals/0/Publications/Workplace-Background-2010-USBC.pdf (exploring how breastfeeding is a
matter of public health); see also Stephanie Sikora, Note, A Permission Slip to Breastfeed:
Legislating a Mother’s Choice in Pennsylvania, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 781, 782–83
(2010) (quoting Jacqueline H. Wolf, What Families Can Do for Breastfeeding and What
Breastfeeding Can Do for Feminists, 31 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 397, 410 (2006))
(“[C]lassify[ing] the United States’ low breastfeeding rates as a ‘public health challenge’”). If all
mothers breastfed their children, at least one billion dollars in health care costs would be saved
annually. Christrup, supra note 10, at 477; Christup, supra note 12, at 266. Another estimate
calculates $13 billion in health care savings annually if ninety percent of new mothers breastfed.
U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra.
14. Cf. Why Breastfeeding is Important, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://www.womenshealth
.gov/breastfeeding/why-breastfeeding-is-important/ (last updated Aug. 4, 2011) (estimating that
“formula and feeding supplies can cost well over $1,500 each year”).
15. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UPDATING THE USDA NATIONAL BREASTFEEDING CAMPAIGN
5 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13235 (“WIC provides
participants with supplemental foods, nutrition education[,] and referrals to health and social
services in addition to breastfeeding promotion and support.”). According to the Institute of
Medicine, “breastfeeding is a priority for everyone involved with WIC [and a]ll mothers are
encouraged to breastfeed unless medically contraindicated.” Id. at 8.
16. Ruth Marcus, A Lobbying Formula for Deficit Disaster, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, at
A19.
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The combined impact of these benefits is among the reasons the American
Academy of Pediatrics recommends exclusive breastfeeding for six months and
continued provision of breast milk for at least one year. 17 Similarly, the World
Health Organization recommends some level of breastfeeding until children are
at least two years of age. 18 The medical community does not dispute that
breastfeeding is important.
Despite the known benefits and specific medical recommendations, the
initiation and continuation rates of breastfeeding have varied over time and
remain low. Recent data reflects that the overall rates for both initiation and
Currently,
continuation of breastfeeding are improving, however. 19
approximately seventy-five percent of new mothers start breastfeeding. 20 Yet,
the percentage of women who are breastfeeding at six months and twelve months
is significantly lower. 21 These numbers depend on a variety of factors, including
marital status, race, education, class, and employment status. Generally, older,
educated, married, wealthier women have the highest rates of initiation and
continuation of breastfeeding. 22 By contrast, less educated, single, non-white,
lower-income mothers have the lowest rates of initiation and continuation. 23
While no population has consistently met the medical recommendations for
breastfeeding, women living at or below poverty level breastfeed at a lower rate
than women in any other economic cohort. 24 Low-income women also continue

17. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 8.
18. Health Topics: Breastfeeding, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/topics
/breastfeeding/en/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); accord Innocenti Declaration On the Protection,
Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/programme/breast
feeding/innocenti.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Innocenti Declaration] (“As a global
goal for optimal maternal and child health and nutrition, all women should [breastfeed infants
exclusively] from birth to 4-6 months of age. Thereafter, children should continue to be breastfed
. . . for up to two years of age or beyond.”).
19. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., BREASTFEEDING REPORT CARD—UNITED STATES, 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/2012BreastfeedingReportCard.pdf.
The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s National Immunization Survey has collected the initiation
and longevity rates of breastfeeding since 2001. Id.
20. FAQs: Break Time for Nursing Mothers, U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., http://www.dol.
gov/whd/nursingmothers/faqBTNM.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
21. Id.
22. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 346.
23. Id.
24. See Breastfeeding, Ever (Percent), HEALTH INDICATORS WAREHOUSE,
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Breastfeeding-ever-percent_1147/Profile/Data
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2014).
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breastfeeding—at both the six-month 25 and twelve-month marks 26—at a lower
rate than other women.
B. Barriers to Breastfeeding at Work
One significant factor in the variation of breastfeeding rates across different
populations of women is employment outside of the home. Less than twenty
percent of women continue breastfeeding after returning to work full time, and
only ten percent of women continue to breastfeed after six months (the medically
recommended minimum length of time to breastfeed). 27 This is problematic for
a government that is concerned about public health, health care costs, families,
businesses, and the economy.
There is a direct relationship between breastfeeding and employment. The
way many workplaces and work schedules are prohibits breastfeeding. 28
Workplace structures often include scheduling inflexibility, 29 lack of break time
and control over when break time may be used, 30 insufficient privacy, 31 lack of
support from supervisors and coworkers, 32 and problems with storage of pump
and milk supplies. 33 These workplace obstacles are problematic for all
breastfeeding workers, but they are even more difficult to overcome for hourly
workers. Unlike workers in professional occupations, who may have their own
offices with doors that can be closed for privacy, hourly workers face not only

25. Breastfeeding, at 6 Months (Percent), HEALTH INDICATORS WAREHOUSE,
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Breastfeeding-at-6-months-percent_1148/Profile/Data
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
26. Breastfeeding, at 1 Year (percent), HEALTH INDICATORS WAREHOUSE,
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Breastfeeding-at-1-year-percent_1149/Profile/Data
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
27. Christrup, supra note 10, at 480.
28. See id. at 480–81 (describing several studies of breastfeeding and the workplace).
29. Gabriela Steier, Womenomics for Nursing Growth: Making the Case for Work Time
Flexibility and Mother-Friendlier Workplaces, 21 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 119, 135
(2013) (“Nonetheless, breastfeeding duration remains low, in part due to inflexible work schedules
. . . .”).
30. Brit Mohler, Note, Is the Breast Best for Business?: The Implications of the Breastfeeding
Promotion Act, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 155, 159 (2011) (observing that “insufficient break
time” creates a deterrent to breastfeeding in the workplace); see also Elsie M. Taveras et al.,
Clinician Support and Psychosocial Risk Factors Associated with Breastfeeding Discontinuation,
112 PEDIATRICS 108, 113 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Salz v. Casey’s Marketing Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 WL 2952998, at
*1 (N.D. Iowa July 19, 2012) (alleging that a camera was installed in the room in which the
employee pumped breast milk, without her knowledge).
32. FAQs: Break Time for Nursing Mothers, supra note 20 (“Returning to an unsupportive
work environment [is] a major reason for the avoidance or early abandonment of breastfeeding.”).
33. KATHERINE R. SHEALY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE CDC
GUIDE TO BREASTFEEDING INTERVENTIONS 7 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov
/breastfeeding/pdf/breastfeeding_interventions.pdf.
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inflexible schedules, but also a greater unavailability of privacy and facilities in
which to pump and store breast milk in the workplace. 34 Further, if a nursing
worker cannot find a way to express at work, it influences her ability to express
at other times. Because a woman’s milk supply diminishes if she cannot
breastfeed at continuous, comfortable, and regular intervals, a woman cannot go
a full day at work without breastfeeding without decreasing, and ultimately
ending, her ability to do so outside of work. 35
Irregular expression also has a direct impact on a woman’s body. For
example, the inability to breastfeed regularly is painful. 36 Milk collects in a
woman’s lactiferous ducts, and her body anticipates that it will be expressed
regularly. 37 If it is not, the nursing mother may experience pain from the builtup milk supply. 38 Further, the lack of expression of milk results in engorgement,
which in turn leads to blocked milk ducts and may possibly cause “infection or
mastitis” and embarrassment. 39
Consequently, studies show that the more hours a woman works, the less
likely she is to breastfeed. 40 Moreover, an inflexible workplace may cause a
nursing worker to wean a child off of breast milk earlier or to choose not to

34. Lisa Hansen, Note, A Comprehensive Framework for Accommodating Nursing Mothers
in the Workplace, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 885, 893–96 (2007) (observing that low-wage workers “not
only lack privacy and adequate breaks, they are also more likely to be subject to harassment for
expressing milk at work”). See generally LIZ WATSON & JENNIFER SWANBERG, FLEXIBLE
WORKPLACE SOLUTIONS FOR LOW-WAGE HOURLY WORKERS (2011) (describing disparities in the
experiences of low-wage and other workers with respect to flexible scheduling, and other
workplace structures).
35. Christup, supra note 12, at 266 (explaining that milk production is an “intricate process
of supply and demand which necessitates breastfeeding or pumping at regular intervals”); Williams,
supra note 9, at 1020–21 (observing that the “production of breastmilk is a supply and demand
system . . . a woman’s supply of breastmilk will literally dry up if she is unable to nurse or pump
for periods of eight hours or more for several consecutive days”). Once milk production stops, it
does not commence again unless the woman goes through childbirth again. See Gardner, supra
note 9, at 261; Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 337.
36. Christup, supra note 12, at 266.
37. See Breastfeeding: Helpful Tips, COMPREHENSIVE WOMEN’S HEALTH SERVS.,
http://comprehensivewomenshealthservice.com/?page_id=153 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
38. See id.
39. Michelle A. Angeletti, Workplace Lactation Program: A Nursing Friendly Initiative, 31
J. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES ADMIN. 223, 230 (2008); see also Jacobson v. Regent Assisted
Living, Inc., No. CV-98-564-ST, 1999 WL 373790, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999) (describing the
plaintiff’s feelings of embarrassment after leaking at work); U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra
note 13, at 5–6 (describing the impact of missing even one session of expressing milk). Mastitis,
which may result from failing to regularly express milk, is “a painful swelling and inflammation of
the breasts.” Id. at 6.
40. See, e.g., Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Women’s Decisions About Breastfeeding and
Maternal Employment, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 239, 241 (1996) (discussing the “linear
relationship between hours of employment and breastfeeding continuance”).
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breastfeed at all. 41 The decisions to return to work and to discontinue
breastfeeding are often dependent on each other. 42
The dominant workplace culture in America increases the potential for
embarrassment. Workers are hesitant to use words such as “breast,” “lactation,”
“expression,” “milk,” or other related terminology, especially with coworkers
and supervisors of the opposite sex, in part “because of heightened sensitivity to
the possibility (or perception) of sexual harassment.” 43 This concern that talking
about breasts would sexualize the workplace influences the way breastfeeding
is perceived at work.
This concern is not unfounded. Workers have been harassed at work
regarding breastfeeding. 44 Supervisors and coworkers have made comments
about growth in the size of a nursing worker’s breasts because of breastfeeding. 45
Colleagues have “mooed” at nursing workers. 46 Nursing workers have been told
that they will “smell like curdled milk” or will be “dripping wet.” 47 In addition,
breastfeeding workers have been deprived of the ability to change clothing if
leakage occurred. 48 There are also countless stories of coworkers, bosses,
customers, and others walking in on nursing workers while they were pumping,
with their breasts exposed. 49 These experiences emphasize that the structure and
41. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO SUPPORT BREASTFEEDING 14 (2011) [hereinafter
SURGEON
GENERAL’S
CALL
TO
ACTION],
available
at
http://www.surgeon
general.gov/library/calls/breastfeeding/calltoactiontosupportbreastfeeding.pdf.
42. Lindberg, supra note 40, at 248 (“[T]he decisions to start work and stop breastfeeding are
made simultaneously.”).
43. U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra note 13, at 4; see also Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 360
(“[W]omen’s breasts carry a stigma of sexuality, sensuality, physicality, and desire. While there is
nothing sexually explicit about breastfeeding, it carries the same stigma [and] often requires a
woman to expose some part of her breast.”).
44. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, On the Job, Nursing Mothers are Finding a 2-Class System, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A1 (describing the experience of a dental hygienist whose supervisor “wore
a Halloween costume consisting of a large silver box . . . with a cutout labeled ‘insert breast here’”
when she pumped at work).
45. See, e.g., Donaldson v. American Banco Corp., Inc, 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (D. Colo.
1996) (reporting that one employee told another “Jesus, Patty, your tits are huge!”).
46. See, e.g., Falk v. City of Glendale, No. 12-CV-00925-JLK, 2012 WL 2390556, at *1 (D.
Colo. June 25, 2012).
47. Donaldson, 945 F. Supp. at 1462.
48. See, e.g., Falk, 2012 WL 2390556, at *1; Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., CV98-564-ST, 1999 WL 373790, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999) (noting that the plaintiff alleged that she
was denied break time and “forced to sit on [a] plane drenched in breast milk”).
49. See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that
individuals attempted to enter the room in which the plaintiff was pumping with a key on more than
one occasion); Heidi Blake, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable
Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1507
(“[O]n
several
occasions,
[coworkers] blew past my sign and walked in on me . . . .They may be doctors, but they are still my
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culture of a woman’s workplace has a large impact on her ability to breastfeed.
Thus, women who are unable to breastfeed at work are often faced with a
difficult choice: keep their paychecks or breastfeed. 50
These issues are particularly significant because, for the first time, women
constitute half of the American workforce. 51 Approximately seventy percent of
mothers are full-time workers, 52 and the fastest growing segment of the
workforce is women with children under the age of three. 53 Recognizing these
changes in workforce demographics and worker needs, as well as a documented

colleagues, and they were pretty embarrassed at seeing my breasts exposed.”); Abbie Keibler,
Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing
Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1709 (“I have now had my door UNLOCKED and opened TWICE
(both with males) who did no understand what I was doing. It was humiliating.”); Amanda Kowski,
Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing
Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;
D=WHD-2010-0003-1396 (“I was walked in on numerous times, much to THEIR
embarrassment.”); Laura Isabel Serna, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice:
Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1479 (describing an incident
in which the commenter’s supervisor “used his master key to walk [into her] office when the door
was closed”).
50. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 268 (“Because of the positive impact breastfeeding has on
a woman’s health, when we fail to accommodate breastfeeding in the workplace, we effectively
force her to choose between her health and her employment. Even worse, we also force her to
choose between her child’s health and her employment.”); Lindberg, supra note 40, at 239
(exploring the intersection of employment and breastfeeding).
51. See MARIA SHRIVER & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SHRIVER REPORT 17 (Heather
Boushey & Ann O’Leary eds., 2009), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf; see also CAROLYN B. MALONEY
& CHARLES E. SCHUMER, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 2010 4
(2010), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=8be22cb0-8ed0-4a1a
-841b-aa91dc55fa81 (providing empirical data that demonstrates the shift in workforce
demographics).
52. Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley: Health Care Amendment Looks Out for
Nursing Mothers (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom
/press/release/?id=921fc624-42df-42c8-bffe-1c9c3e941e8f.
53. SHEALY ET AL., supra note 33 (“Approximately 70% of employed mothers with children
younger than 3 years work full time. One-third of these mothers return to work within 3 months
after birth and two-thirds return within 6 months.”).
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business case, 54 some employers have voluntarily created lactation-supportive
workplace practices. 55
These voluntary business practices are bolstered by an increasing number of
public policy efforts to foster a wider implementation of policies and practices
that support breastfeeding at work. Indeed, the federal government has
undertaken a variety of approaches to increase the initiation and continuation
rates of women breastfeeding by making it easier to breastfeed at work. 56 For

54. See The Business Case for Breastfeeding, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/government-in-action/business-case-for
-breastfeeding/business-case-for-breastfeeding-for-business-managers.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2014); U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra note 13, at 9–11. Lactation programs have a strong
return on investment because they help to increase job satisfaction, lower absenteeism and tardiness
rates, lower health care costs, increase post-maternity reentry rates, and reduce training costs as a
result of better retention rates. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 271 (describing a UCLA School of
Nursing study that found that nursing mothers had a twenty-seven percent lower rate of absenteeism
and that “[o]ne day absences were three times more common in the mothers of formula-fed
infants”). An HMO study found that formula-fed children accumulated $1,435 more in health care
claims than children who were breastfed exclusively for at least six months. Id. Others have noted
the economic benefits afforded to employers by accommodating nursing workers. See, e.g.,
Mohler, supra note 30, at 163 (observing that “notable employer benefits include fewer missed
work days, reduced heath care costs, fewer instances of employee turnover . . . increased employee
loyalty” and a positive reputation within the community); see also Christrup, supra note 10, at 477
(characterizing breastfeeding as “economically frugal”).
55. See, e.g., Healthy Babies Make Happy Moms and Excellent Employees!, CORPORATE
VOICES FOR WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.corporatevoices.org/lactation.
56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1790(a) (2006) (enacted “to promote breastfeeding as the best
method of infant nutrition, foster wider public acceptance of breastfeeding . . . , and assist in the
distribution of breastfeeding equipment to breastfeeding women”); DIVISION OF MATERNAL AND
CHILD HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL’S
WORKSHOP ON BREASTFEEDING & HUMAN LACTATION 63 (1984), available at
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCGG.pdf (reporting that a “national breastfeeding
promotion initiative directed to all those who influence the breastfeeding decisions and
opportunities of women involved in school, job training, professional education, and employment
is needed”). More recent policy initiatives also support breastfeeding more generally. For example,
the White House Task Force on Childhood Obesity supports breastfeeding-friendly policies. EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY WITHIN
A
GENERATION
13–15
(2010),
available
at
http://www.letsmove.gov/sites/lets
move.gov/files/TaskForce_on_Childhood_Obesity_May2010_FullReport.pdf. Likewise, the First
Lady’s Let’s Move! initiative promotes breastfeeding as a method to reduce childhood obesity.
Press Release, The White House, Office of the First Lady, First Lady Unveils Let’s Move! Child
Care to Ensure Healthy Start for Youngest Children (June 8, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/08/first-lady-unveils-lets-move-child-care
-ensure-healthy-start-youngest-ch. Similarly, in February 2011, the IRS, for the first time,
identified pumps and other breastfeeding supplies as medical expenses that are eligible for a tax
deduction. I.R.S. Announcement 2011-14 (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/a-11-14.pdf. But see Emily F. Suski, Note, In One Place, But Not Another: When the Law
Encourages Breastfeeding in Public While Simultaneously Discouraging it at Work, 12 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 109, 113 (2001) (observing that, by promoting breastfeeding “but failing to
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example, Healthy People 2020, a Department of Health and Human Services
project that develops science-based federal objectives to improve the country’s
health, 57 recently sought to increase breastfeeding rates by encouraging more
employers to implement supportive breastfeeding policies. 58 Additionally, the
Surgeon General issued an updated “Call to Action to Support Breastfeeding”
in 2011, which reiterated that supportive workplaces are necessary to
“enable[] mothers to continue breastfeeding as long as they desire.” 59 This call
for supportive workplace practices echoed the World Health Organization and
United Nations Children’s Fund’s 1990 joint policy statement, which was
adopted by over thirty countries and contained a requirement for “imaginative
legislation protecting the breastfeeding rights of working women and established
means for its enforcement.” 60
C. Early Litigation and Legislative History
Despite efforts to encourage breastfeeding-friendly business practices and
supportive policy initiatives, women continued to experience problems with
breastfeeding at work, including harassment, discrimination, the denial of time
or private space to pump, and termination from employment. Some women
challenged their employers’ actions. These women brought cases under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 61 Title VII as amended by the
encourage it in the workplace,” the law has a “fragmented approach” that “exclude[s] women from
work”).
57. About Healthy People, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2020, http://healthypeople.gov
/2020/about/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 17, 2012).
PEOPLE
2020,
58. Maternal,
Infant,
and
Child
Health,
HEALTHY
http://healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/objectiveslist.aspx?topicId=26 (last updated
Aug. 28, 2013).
59. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 344 (describing an earlier blueprint effort from the Department
of Health and Human Services). See generally SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION, supra note
41.
60. Innocenti Declaration, supra note 18; see also INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, UNICEF,
1990–2005: CELEBRATING THE INNOCENTI DECLARATION ON THE PROTECTION, PROMOTION AND
SUPPORT OF BREASTFEEDING vii, 11 (2005), available at http://www.unicef.org/nutrition
/files/Innocenti_plus15_BreastfeedingReport.pdf (elaborating on UNICEF’s intent to create
“imaginative legislation” to promote supportive workplace practices).
61. Before the PPACA was enacted, courts had not determined that a nursing worker was in
the protected category for Title VII protection. See, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 374
F.3d 428, 439 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that a policy that prohibited
breastfeeding in public would have a disparate impact because the policy differentiated between
breastfeeding women and non-breastfeeding women, two subgroups of the larger protected group
of women); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that
the failure to provide a location in which the plaintiff could express milk was not disparate treatment
because there was no similarly situated group of men to use as comparators); Pitts-Baad v.
Valvoline Instant Oil Change, No. 2012 CA 00028, 2012 WL 4946433, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
15 2012) (rejecting a sex-plus theory based on the failure to accommodate expression because it
“would elevate breast milk pumping—alone—to a protected status”). But see Donaldson v.
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Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 62 the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), 63 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 64 At the time of
American Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1463 (D. Colo. 1996) (allowing a sexual harassment
claim to survive summary judgment).
62. Plaintiffs also unsuccessfully brought Title VII claims that argued that lactation was a
“related medical condition” to pregnancy under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
Houston Funding II, Ltd., No. H-11-2442, 2012 WL 739494, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012) (holding
that all “pregnancy-related conditions end[]” with the delivery and that lactation is not protected by
Title VII), vacated, 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1487,
1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that “child rearing concerns after pregnancy are not [covered]
medical conditions”); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., No. 90-6259, 1991 WL 270823, at * 1 (6th Cir.
Dec. 19, 1991) (holding that a breastfeeding claim under the PDA is only possible if a condition is
medically necessary); McNill v. New York City Dep’t of Correction, 950 F. Supp. 564, 569
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that the medical condition of the plaintiff’s son did not qualify under
the PDA); see also Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act on the Workplace—From a Legal and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM. L. REV.
93, 123–24 (2005) (arguing that lactation is a pregnancy-related physical condition subject to PDA
protection); Elissa Aaronson Goodman, Note, Breastfeeding or Bust: The Need for Legislation to
Protect a Mother’s Right to Express Breast Milk at Work, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 146,
157–58 (2003) (observing that “few women have made a showing that their decision to breastfeed
was, in fact, based on a medical necessity”). On May 30, 2013, the Fifth Circuit held that lactation
discrimination was covered under the PDA. Houston Funding II, 717 F.3d at 426. Analogizing
the physical impact of lactation to the effects of menstruation, the court held that an adverse
employment decision motivated by lactation imposes a burden on women that men do not and
cannot suffer, which can be the basis of a Title VII claim. Id. at 429–30. The court also held that,
because lactation is a physiological condition of pregnancy, it is covered under the PDA. Id. at
428–29; see also Brief for Appellant at *10, Houston Funding II, 717 F.3d 425 (No. 12-20220)
(arguing that the PDA should cover discrimination against female employees based on expressing
milk because “[f]iring a female worker because she is lactating” is “the essence of sex
discrimination”). See supra note 61.
63. Breastfeeding does not qualify for job-protected time off under the FMLA. See, e.g.,
Erickson v. AMN Healthcare Serv., No. 09cv910 BTM (CAB), 2010 WL 2618850, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
June 25, 2010) (holding that “pumping breast milk is not protected by the FMLA”). Nonetheless,
if nursing workers can afford to take unpaid leave and are otherwise eligible under the statute, the
FMLA may help certain women initiate breastfeeding and to continue breastfeeding during the up
to twelve weeks of FMLA-authorized leave after the birth of a child.
29 U.S.C.
§§ 2611(2), (4), 2612(a) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (2013). After returning to work, eligible
nursing employees may take leave intermittently to breastfeed in one-hour increments with their
employer’s permission, but only to the extent the leave relates to pregnancy. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1)
(2006 & Supp. V 2012); 29 C.F.R. § 825.203(b).
64. Nursing workers are not employees “with a disability” under the ADA as enacted. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Bond v. Sterling, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 306
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (using the ADA’s definition of disability to determine that breastfeeding is not a
disability under state law and stating that “[i]t is simply preposterous to contend a woman’s body
is functioning abnormally because she is lactating”); Christrup, supra note 10, at 487–88 (observing
that breastfeeding is related to pregnancy such that it is not covered under the ADA; further
articulating some of the concerns with alleging that breastfeeding is a disability); Eldredge, supra
note 12, at 889, 898 (same); Goodman, supra note 62, at 167–68 (setting forth arguments for and
against ADA claims for nursing workers). It is unclear how these cases will be interpreted under
the ADA, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which expressly includes
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these cases, existing federal law failed to protect nursing workers, allowing
employment barriers to continue. 65
As these cases progressed—and ultimately failed—Congress considered
legislation to create or clarify protections for breastfeeding workers. This
legislation proposed amendments to the FMLA, Title VII, or the FLSA to
provide traditional labor standards that enable women to work while
breastfeeding and to address the discrimination these women experienced at
work.
For example, in 1998, the New Mothers’ Breastfeeding Promotion and
Protection Act was introduced, which would have amended the FMLA by
adding lactation breaks to the list of reasons for which a covered employer had
to provide unpaid, job-protected leave to eligible employees. 66 The legislation
also proposed the creation of a tax credit for any employer expenses related to
providing a place for breastfeeding workers to express milk. 67
In addition, Congresswoman Carolyn D. Maloney, among others, has
repeatedly proposed legislation to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination
against women who are breastfeeding and to encourage employers to support
nursing workers with tax credits. 68 In 2001, Representative Maloney introduced
physiological conditions, dictates that any such condition be assessed in its active state, and has the
stated goal of making it easier for people to access its protections. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4)(D);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1),(j)(1)(vii) (2013). See generally Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin,
Pleading Durability After the ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2013); Chai R. Feldblum,
Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187,
238–39 (2008) (discussing how the amendments seek to broaden the definition of “disability”).
65. By contrast, twenty-four states have laws that address breastfeeding at work. See
Breastfeeding Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues
-research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx (last updated May 2011). Many of these laws
contain provisions that were included in proposed federal legislation. See id.; Marcia L.
McCormick, Gender, Family, and Work, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 309, 331–33 (2013). Other
state law claims also may exist. See Suski, supra note 56, at 139–40 (describing potential tort claim
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and calling for coverage under state
unemployment insurance systems). But see Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs., 685 N.E.2d
1325, 1326–27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that the breastfeeding mother’s decision to quit
was not based on just cause); Perdrix-Wang v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 856 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1993) (en banc) (holding that quitting for the purpose of being able to breastfeed does not
constitute good cause for unemployment compensation purposes).
66. See New Mothers’ Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 1998, H.R. 3531, 105th Cong. § 6
(1998) (proposing to provide a breastfeeding worker with up to one hour per eight hour work day
to express milk and a proportional amount of time for a shift shorter or longer than eight hours);
see also Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, H.R. 1369 110th Cong. (2007) (expanding the
FMLA to provide breaks unless the employer can demonstrate undue hardship); Healthy Lifestyles
and Prevention America Act, S. 1074 109th Cong. § 217 (2005) (same).
67. H.R. 3531 § 4.
68. Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 285, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 201(a) (2001); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001, S. 256, 107th Cong. § 2(1) (2001); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000, H.R. 3861, 106th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2000); Pregnancy
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the Breastfeeding Promotion Act to prohibit discrimination against
breastfeeding women at work and promote accommodations for the expression
of milk at work by offering a tax credit to employers who provided a location
for its workers to do so. 69 The bill would have amended Title VII by adding
lactation to the definition of “because of sex” or as a premise on which
discrimination “on the basis of sex” is prohibited. 70 Representative Maloney
reintroduced the Breastfeeding Promotion Act in 2003, 2007, and 2009 and alos
regularly reintroduced her prior legislation. 71 Similarly, Senator Olympia
Snowe repeatedly introduced the Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments,
which contained similar language to amend Title VII. 72
Finally, in 2009, Representative Maloney and Senator Jeff Merkley
introduced a House and Senate bill respectively that combined traditional labor
standards and employment discrimination provisions for breastfeeding working
women. 73
These companion bills included the same provisions as
Representative Maloney’s 2001 bill, as well as an amendment to the FLSA
requiring employers with fifty or more employees to provide breastfeeding
employees with break time and private areas to express breast milk. 74 In 2010,
Senator Merkley included the proposed FLSA amendment from his 2009 bill as
part of a larger health care reform bill. 75 That proposal later became section

Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000, S. 3023, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (2000); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act Amendments of 1999, H.R. 1478, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (1999); New Mothers’
Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 1998, H.R. 3531, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).
69. See H.R. 285 §§ 102(b), 201(a).
70. Id. (proposing an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
71. Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2009, H.R. 2819, 111th Cong. (2009); Breastfeeding
Promotion Act of 2007, H.R. 2236, 110th Cong. (2007); Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 2790,
108th Cong. (2003); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005, H.R. 2122, 109th Cong.
(2005); see also bills listed supra note 68.
72. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2003, S. 418, 108th Cong. (2003);
Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001, S. 256, 107th Cong. (2001); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000, 106th Cong. (2000).
73. See H.R. 2819, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 501 (2009); S. 1244, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 501 (2009).
74. See H.R. 2819, §§ 101, 501; S. 1244, §§ 101, 501. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207
(2006 & Supp. V 2012), with S. 1244, § 501(a), and H.R. 2819, § 501(a). Had this legislation been
adopted, it would have been more comprehensive than the PPACA because it included mandatory
accommodations, antidiscrimination protections, and employer incentives.
75. See Press Release, Breastfeeding Amendment Adopted Unanimously During Markup of
Health Care Reform Legislation, supra note 52; Mary Agnes Carey, Phil Galewitz, & Laurie
McGinley, Kaiser Health News, 7 Items You Didn’t Know Were in the Senate Bill, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 30, 2009 3:31:49 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34209992/nsfhealth-health-care!
(describing the nursing workers amendment as being in the “congressional tradition” of “adding
pet interests that otherwise might not pass to a big bill that at least will be put up for a vote”); see
also Nicole Kennedy Orozco, Note, Pumping at Work: Protection from Lactation Discrimination
in the Workplace, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281, 1293 (2010).
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4207 of the PPACA, the first federal law to specifically address breastfeeding at
work. 76
II. THE PPACA’S CHANGES TO THE FLSA
With the PPACA, Congress adopted traditional labor standards and
accommodations that require employers to support women who pump milk at
work, with the goal of promoting breastfeeding by and economic security for
low-income workers. 77 Since March 23, 2010, the PPACA has required
employers to provide reasonable break time and a private location, other than a
restroom, for certain employees to express milk for up to one year after a child’s
birth. 78 In December 2010, the Department of Labor (Department) issued a
Request for Information seeking public comment and published preliminary
guidance on a number of the new law’s provisions. 79
A. The FLSA’s New Provisions
The PPACA amended the FLSA to create two new rights for breastfeeding
workers: the ability to take job-protected breaks to express milk and access to a
private space in which to express. 80
1. Break Time
Section 4207 of the PPACA states that “[a]n employer shall provide a
reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing
child for one year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to
express the milk.” 81 The statute does not define what constitutes “reasonable
break time” or determine how to evaluate whether a woman “needs to express”
breast milk. 82

76. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r). However, every year since 1999, Congresswoman Maloney has
included the “Right to Breastfeed Act” in the appropriations process. KAREN M. KEDROWKI
& MICHAEL E. LIPSCOMB, BREASTFEEDING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 65–66 (2008). The
Act states that “a woman may breastfeed her child on any portion of Federal property where the
woman and her child are otherwise authorized to be.” See Right to Breastfeed Act, H.R. 1848,
106th Cong. § 2 (1999). In practice, this has given federal employees a limited right to breastfeed
at work. KEDROWKI & LIPSCOMB, supra, at 64–65.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r), (r)(1)(B).
79. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80073, 80075 (Dec. 21,
2010). 1, 857 comments were submitted in response to this request for information; the authors
read all publicly available comments.
Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers,
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; D=WHD-2010-0003-0001
(last updated Feb. 22, 2011).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1).
81. Id. § 207(r)(1)(A).
82. See generally id. § 207(r).
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The Department’s preliminary interpretation of the law is that breastfeeding
workers typically need two to three breaks during an eight-hour shift to express
milk. 83 According to the Department, the length of the break needed may vary,
but expressing breast milk typically will take fifteen to twenty minutes. 84
Moreover, in determining what constitutes “reasonable break time,” employers
should consider the availability of a sink and refrigerator, the time it takes to
walk to retrieve supplies and travel to the designated space, and whether those
supplies have to be unpacked and assembled. 85 Further, the Department
encourages employees and employers to communicate their expectations and
develop a mutual understanding about the length and frequency of breaks taken
for this purpose. 86
Although the PPACA does not dictate the manner in which an employee is to
communicate her intent to exercise her rights to break time and space to express
milk, the Department suggested that workers should “facilitate an employer’s
ability to provide appropriate space for expressing milk” by providing employers
with advance notice of their intent to take breaks. 87 The FMLA contains a
similar notice provision that requires employees to provide thirty days notice of
the need for foreseeable leave. 88 However, unlike the FMLA, the Department’s
guidance does not address whether an employee should communicate with her
employer each time she needs to use her break time for lactation or each time
her lactation needs change. What is reasonable or necessary for a worker

83. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075 (explaining that
the Department consulted with public health officials to conclude that a nursing baby needs to feed
every two to three hours and thus a nursing mother must continue to produce milk on a basis
consistent with this timing or she may lose the ability to breastfeed).
84. Id.
85. Id. After milk is expressed by hand or pump it must be refrigerated. Christup, supra note
12, at 267.
86. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075. Based upon
experience with similar language in the FMLA regarding scheduling of intermittent leave, this
proposal is likely to lead to confusion and litigation. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (2006) (stating that
leave for the birth of an employee’s son or daughter or placement of a son or daughter with the
employee for adoption or foster care “shall not be taken by an employee intermittently or on a
reduced leave schedule unless the employee and the employer of the employee agree otherwise”).
87. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077; see also Miller v.
Roche Sur. & Cas. Co., Inc., 502 F. App’x 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that an email to a
colleague mentioning the law generally and the need for space and coverage to pump was
insufficient notice to trigger protection under the PPACA).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) (describing how, if the leave is foreseeable based on expected
birth or placement, the employee shall provide the employer with not less than 30 days’ notice); 29
U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2) (describing how, if the leave is foreseeable, the employee must make
reasonable effort to avoid disrupting the operations of the employer).
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breastfeeding a three-month-old child may be different than what is reasonable
or necessary for a worker breastfeeding a ten-month-old child. 89
The Department also stated that an employer may ask an expectant mother if
she intends to exercise her rights under the PPACA, asserting that doing so
“informs the employee of their rights under the law.” 90 This statement is
logically flawed. It assumes that asking an employee if she plans to take
lactation breaks equates to notifying her of her rights to take both lactation
breaks and to take them in a private location at her workplace. 91 It also ignores
the reality that having an employer ask this question may have the effect of
intimidating the expecting mother into either choosing not to breastfeed or
limiting how much she plans to breastfeed.
Finally, the Department does not consider expressing milk to be a reason that
qualifies an employee to take FMLA leave. 92 Therefore, any break time taken
under the PPACA will not count against any FMLA leave to which the employee
may be entitled. 93 Moreover, the Department states that an employer may
violate Title VII if it treats employees who take breaks to express milk under the
PPACA differently than employees who take breaks for personal reasons under
a disparate treatment theory. 94 This is important because the PPACA does not
provide employment discrimination protection, and previous attempts to bring
breastfeeding cases under Title VII failed. 95
2. Private Space
The PPACA requires all employers to provide “a place other than a bathroom,
that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the
public, which may be used by an employee to express breast milk.” 96 The

89. See, e.g., Letter from Jacqueline Marlette-Boras, Director, Office of the Maryland WIC
Program, to Montaniel Navarro, FLSA Branch Chief, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department
of Labor (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD
-2010-0003-1214 (noting the different experiences of breastfeeding infants of different ages).
90. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077.
91. The FMLA regulations regarding an employer’s duty to provide an employee notice of
her rights under the FMLA are instructive. See 29 C.F.R § 825.300(a)(3), (b) (2013) (describing
an employer’s duty to post notice explaining the law’s provisions, to include notice in any employee
handbooks, and to notify the employee of her eligibility to take FMLA).
92. This is because expressing milk does not constitute bonding with and caring for a newborn
child, nor is caring for a newborn child by expressing milk deemed a serious health condition for
the purposes of the FMLA. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077;
see also supra note 63 (providing an overview of previous failed attempts to use the FMLA for this
purpose).
93. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 61–62 (providing an overview of previous failed attempts to use Title
VII).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2012).
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Department interprets this provision to mean that an employer should provide a
room if possible, and, if a room is not available, use partitions and curtains to
achieve the required privacy. 97 Windows must be covered and the door should
be locked or marked with a sign. 98
Although employers are not required to maintain a permanent room or space
dedicated for lactation, a designated, private space must be available when
necessary. 99 The Department interprets the statute to require an employer to
provide a space for lactation even if the employee is not at her primary work
location, but rather is working at another location or client worksite. 100 The
Department also interprets the PPACA as requiring the provisions of a space in
which to safely store the milk. 101 While employers are not required to provide
refrigeration, they must permit breastfeeding workers to bring a pump for
expressing milk and an insulated container for storing the milk, as well as a place
to store these supplies. 102
B. Limitations on the FLSA Amendment
The PPACA’s time and space rights are limited in three ways. First, the law
creates an affirmative defense for employers with fewer than fifty employees,
which allows an employer to avoid providing time and space for lactation if
doing so would impose an undue hardship on the business. Second, the PPACA
does not protect all workers. Finally, the law offers limited remedies or means
of enforcement if an employer violates its provisions.
1. The Affirmative Undue Hardship Defense
The PPACA’s break time and space accommodation requirements are
mandatory for employers with fifty or more employees. 103 By contrast,
employers with fewer than fifty employees need not provide these
accommodations if they can demonstrate an undue hardship. 104 The employer
bears the burden of establishing that it qualifies for this defense vis-à-vis the
97. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075–76 (noting that
the ante room or lounge area connected to a bathroom would meet the statutory requirements,
provided that there is a wall separating the rooms; conversely, locker rooms more likely would not
meet the requirements).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 80076.
100. Id. at 80077. Although this Department guidance is helpful, it is incomplete and leaves
many questions unanswered. For example, although an employer is required to provide a room if
possible, it is unclear from whose perspective “possible” is defined. It is also unclear what “free
from intrusion” means. For example, it is unclear if aural privacy is required or whether a shared
room that supports multiple employees who are or need to express milk suffices.
101. Id. at 80076.
102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (Supp. V. 2012).
104. Id. § 207(r)(3).
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number of employees and that compliance with the statute’s requirements would
meet the required level of hardship. 105 With respect to calculating the number
of employees for purposes of this defense, the PPACA adopts the FLSA’s
definition of “employee,” which includes both full- and part-time workers. 106 In
addition, the Department instructs employers to count all employees at all work
sites. 107 With respect to demonstrating the requisite level of hardship, the
PPACA requires a “significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation
to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s
business.” 108 The Department believes that few employers will be successful in
asserting this defense given the limitations in the law’s requirements and the
high burden an employer must overcome to assert the defense. 109
2. Eligibility Limitations
The PPACA contains three important eligibility limitations: by class, type of
breastfeeding, and employer size. First, the PPACA contains two provisions that
limit coverage by class. The first class limitation is explicitly identified in the
text of the statute: the protections are limited to non-exempt employees. 110 A
“non-exempt” employee is one who is not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime
protections based on salary, position, or some other factor. 111 Teachers and
administrators in elementary and secondary schools, a large number of who are
women of child-rearing age, also are deemed non-exempt employees. 112
Generally, non-exempt workers are hourly employees who earn less than $455

105. Id.
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006); § 207(r)(3).
107. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(3).
109. 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077 (“Employers with fewer than 50 employees may not presume that
having a smaller workforce by itself sufficiently demonstrates that compliance would pose a
significant difficulty or expense[.]”).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006); see Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 80074 (noting that only employees who are not exempt from section 7 of the FLSA are entitled
to break time). However, all federal workers are covered in an effort to ensure consistency.
Memorandum from John Berry, Director, United States Office of Personnel Management to Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov
/whd/nursingmothers/NMothersFederalEmplymnt.pdf (requiring agencies to allow exempt
employees to use these protections “to ensure consistent treatment of nursing mothers within the
Federal workforce”).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a); see Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Computer & Outside Sales Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
(July 2008), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/fairpay/fs17a_overview.pdf.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see Fast Facts, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATS.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=28 (observing that over three-quarters of public school
teachers are women; forty-four percent of which are under the age of 40).
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a week and work in non-supervisory positions. 113 By itself, this limitation
excludes approximately twelve million otherwise eligible salaried women from
qualifying for the PPACA’s breastfeeding protections. 114 Despite this
acknowledged limitation, the Department “hopes that employers will provide
this right to express breastfeeding to all workers, regardless of [their] status
under the FLSA.” 115
The law also implicitly limits coverage by class by providing that break time
need not be paid. 116 According to the Department, although the statute does not
require compensation during breaks, if employers otherwise pay employees
during breaks, “an employee who uses [her] break time to express milk must be
paid in the same way that other employees are compensated for break time.” 117
Moreover, if the employer only permits breaks of twenty minutes or less, the
break time must be counted as hours worked in calculating whether the
employee has satisfied the FLSA’s minimum overtime and wage
requirements. 118 The Department also encourages employers to provide flexible

113. See J. Bradley Sedaris, Wage and Hour Myths: Illuminating the Truth Behind
Misconceptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 72 ALA. LAW. 462, 465 (2011) (describing how
a salaried worker could be a non-exempt worker).
114. Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Introduces Breastfeeding Legislation and
Highlights Portland Police Bureau’s Commitment to Working Mothers (May 13, 2013), available
at
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=516937a6-9599-4f90-aad1
-2b844883481b.
115. Melvina C. Ford, Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division,
Written Testimony for the Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with
Caregiving
Responsibilities
Meeting
(Feb.
15,
2012),
available
at
http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/ford.cfm?renderforprint=1.
The
federal
government has elected to follow this suggestion. See Memorandum from John Berry, Director,
United States Office of Personnel Management to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
supra note 110.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(2) (Supp. V. 2012).
117. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80073, 80074 (Dec. 21,
2010); Fact Sheet #73: Break Time for Nursing Mothers under the FLSA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR
WAGE
AND
HOUR
DIVISION,
(Aug.
2012),
http://www.dol.gov/whd
/regs/compliance/whdfs73.pdf.
118. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075. In addition,
employees must be completely relieved of duty for breaks to be unpaid. Id. A number of comments
submitted in response to the Department’s preliminary guidance contained statements of workers’
interest in doing light duty work that involved reading or using a computer while pumping. See,
e.g., Melanie Higgins, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break
Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-0099; Kerri Sullivan, Comment on the
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers,
REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD
-2010-0003-0246; Catherine Truxillo, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice:
Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-0641.
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scheduling for employees who seek to make up for unpaid break time used to
express milk. 119
Second, the PPACA protects only one type of breastfeeding. The statute
requires employers to provide break time “for an employee to express breast
milk.” 120 However, expressing milk by pumping to preserve it for later
consumption is only one type of breastfeeding. The term “breastfeeding” refers
to feeding a child via milk produced or stored in a woman’s body. This may be
done by expressing milk or by the process of suckling, whereby a child attaches
to the mother’s body to eat. 121 The PPACA addresses only the expression of
milk, not suckling. 122
Third, the law uses a new type of employer threshold requirement to limit its
scope. Before the PPACA, federal employment and discrimination law took one
of two approaches to limiting eligibility based on employer coverage. One
approach, found in the majority of federal employment laws, requires employers
to have a defined number of employees before the substantive requirements
apply. For example, Title VII and the ADA only apply if an employer has at
least fifteen employees. 123 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) only applies if an employer has at least twenty employees. 124 The
FMLA only applies if an employer has at least fifty employees in a seventy-five
mile radius. 125 The other approach applies the statute’s provisions regardless of
the number of employees working for a particular employer. For example,
provisions of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act (USERRA) apply to all employers. 126 By contrast, the PPACA uses a hybrid
model by combining the two approaches. The PPACA applies to all employers,
119. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075. The breaks must
be paid if the employer pays employees for other break times. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (r)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
121. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 337 (discussing the mechanics of producing breast milk); see
also KEDROWKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 76, at 2 (arguing that different definitions of
“breastfeeding” may lead to varying legal consequences); U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra
note 13, at 5–6. Pumping devices vary in cost, speed, and size. Id. at 6. Other options to breastfeed
include bringing a child to work, having someone else bring a child to work, or leaving work to go
to a child. KEDROWKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 76, at 16.
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A). This also has class implications, given the expense
associated with purchasing pumps, bottles, or other items necessary to use expression as a food
source for a child.
123. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101
-336, § 101(5)(a), 104 Stat. 327, 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006)).
124. Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11(b), 81 Stat.
602, 605 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006)).
125. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101, 107 Stat. 6, 8 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2006)).
126. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-353, § 4303, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150–51 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(a) (2006)).
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regardless of the number of employees at a particular worksite, but the undue
hardship defense only applies to employers with less than fifty employees. 127
Finally, all employment laws contain some type of eligibility restriction. The
PPACA, however, is the first law to cover such a small group of primarily lowincome workers who choose to engage in a particular activity (breastfeeding)
that society wants to encourage by offering protections to engage in a specific
form of that activity (expression) at work, while also allowing small employers
to opt out of supporting the activity.
3. Limited Remedies and Enforcement Mechanisms
The PPACA does not specify a penalty for an employer that violates the break
time or space requirements. Instead, the PPACA incorporates the FLSA’s
penalty provision, which states:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section
207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected
in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid
overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages. 128
Thus, while the FLSA provides a private right of action for employees to
recover unpaid wages, in most instances the failure to provide lactation breaks
or space to a nursing mother will not result in lost wages. Typically, designated
break time is unpaid and the failure to provide space is not associated with
unpaid wages or other compensation. The FLSA also imposes a civil penalty
for willful or repeated violations that may now include violations of PPACA
provisions. 129 However, in reality, the PPACA lacks a reliable enforcement
mechanism because there is no penalty available and proof of willful or repeated
violations will be difficult—if not impossible—to obtain. 130
A nursing worker who has been discharged or discriminated against because
she attempted to enforce her break time or space rights may still file a retaliation
complaint with the Department or file a private cause of action seeking remedies

127. No further guidance is provided on how to count employees for this threshold. See 29
U.S.C. § 207(r)(3).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2) (2006) (“Any person who repeatedly or willfully violates
section 206 or 207, relating to wages, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $1,100 for
each such violation.”); see also Sarah Andrews, Lactation Breaks in the Workplace: What
Employers Need to Know About the Nursing Mothers Amendment to the FLSA, 30 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 121, 140 (2012) (analyzing this provision).
130. This limited enforcement schema was upheld in one of the few cases decided under the
PPACA to date. See Salz v. Casey’s Mktg. Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 WL 2952998, at *3
(N.D. Iowa July 19, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss alleged PPACA violations because section
216(b) limits enforcement to unpaid wages).
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like reinstatement or lost wages. 131 Additionally, if an employer refuses to
comply with the law, a breastfeeding worker may file a claim with the
Department, which in turn could seek injunctive relief in federal court to obtain
reinstatement, lost wages, and access to break and space to express milk should
it so choose. 132 For example, if an employer terminates a nursing worker
because she takes breaks to express milk or because she indicated her intent to
take breaks to express, the Department may intervene to enforce her rights under
the PPACA. 133 Unfortunately, in reality, the combination of limited potential
remedies and lack of enforcement resources will hamper the law’s utility.
III. A NEW TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW?
By adopting these substantive rights and limitations, Congress combined a
mix of employment law concepts to achieve the public health goal of promoting
breastfeeding among certain low-income working mothers. Congress could
have supported breastfeeding in this population in a number of ways. For
example, Congress could have included antidiscrimination provisions for
lactating mothers, or new moms generally, if the goal was to overcome the
barriers described above. Congress also could have mandated that employers
provide on-site day care. Yet, Congress elected not to create such
provisions. The inclusion of these specific provisions in the PPACA represents
Congress’s deliberate choice about how to achieve a public health goal by
harkening back to familiar labor standards and employment discrimination
provisions, yet integrating these provisions in a form not yet seen before in
employment law.
The PPACA not only selectively borrows concepts from existing laws, but it
also represents something rarely seen in employment law: at-work protections
for a relatively small set of individuals to promote specific out-of-work
conduct. 134 The PPACA clearly promotes breastfeeding by requiring the
131. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to discharge or
in any other manner discriminate against any employee because she has filed a complaint or
instituted any proceeding); Ford, supra note 115; see, e.g., Boxum-Debolt v. Office of the Dist.
Att’y, No. 12–2641–KHV, 2013 WL5466915 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2013).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (2006); Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg.
80073, 80078 (Dec. 21, 2010); see, e.g., Salz, 2012 WL 2952998 (relying on this limitation to deny
a private lawsuit).
133. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80078 (stating that this
would violate 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2)).
134. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 369 (2002) (observing that “[m]ost statutes
governing the workplace only apply within the context of the employment relationship”). Two
additional areas of employment law that create protections to encourage participation in behavior
that does not relate to one’s current jobinvolve encouraging civilian participation in the militia and
seeking services after domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, or stalking. See, e.g., 38
U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (providing labor standards and antidiscrimination protection “to encourage
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provision of job protection for reasonable break time and defined space
accommodations for low-income workers to pump milk. These provisions—
and the failure to include others that were proffered—represent a shift in the
purpose of employment law. This invites the question of whether the new
direction represented in this statute is one that should be repeated.
A. “Traditional” Employment Law and Theory
Over the years, scholars and advocates have offered different classifications
and theories to justify employment law. 135 One common way to classify
employment laws is to identify them as either traditional labor standards or as
discrimination protections. Traditional labor standards require an employer to
do—or not do—something for an individual employee “as a condition of
engaging in commerce.” 136 By contrast, employment discrimination provisions
prohibit an employer from taking actions based on an employee’s membership
in a statutorily defined group, or from implementing a facially neutral policy that
has a disparate impact on a statutorily defined group. 137
noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to
civilian careers and employment which can result from such service”); Victims’ Economic Security
and Safety Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15 1, 3 (2009) (“[E]nabling victims of domestic or
sexual violence to maintain the financial independence necessary to leave abusive situations,
achieve safety, and minimize the physical and emotional injuries from domestic or sexual violence,
and to reduce the devastating economic consequences . . . by entitling employed victims of domestic
or sexual violence to take unpaid leave to seek medical help, legal assistance, counseling, safety
planning, and other assistance without penalty from their employers [among other things]”).
Employment law arguably also has incentivized certain behavior in whistleblower
situations. Under whistleblower laws, employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees
who disclose illegal, corrupt, or wasteful activity. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101–12, § 3 103 Stat. 16, 29 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1218–19, 1221 (2012))
(providing a right of action for terminated whistleblowers). However, whistleblower protections
are clearly linked to employment because they encourage employees to report illegal or unsafe
activities at their workplaces, and, thus, are distinguishable from the other non-job related behavior.
135. See Befort, supra note 134, at 378 (arguing that recent employment laws have either
created minimum workplace standards or prevented employers from discriminating against
members of a protected category); James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675,
1743 n.204 (1999) (same); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equity, 112 MICH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208883.
136. Workplace Flexibility 2010, Workplace Flexibility: An Overview of Nondiscrimination
Models 33 (Fall 2007) (on file with authors). Some scholars call this type of law, under which an
employer either has the duty to act or is prohibited from acting, a “minimum rights statute” or
“minimum standards.” See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 120; William R. Corbett, The Need
for A Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 130–31 (2003); Benjamin
I. Sachs, Employment Law As Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2701–02 (2008) (comparing
minimum rights statutes to labor law’s collective rights approach); Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum
Wage As A Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative To Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2009).
137. See Befort, supra note 134, at 379; Corbett, supra note 136, at 141.
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Traditional labor standard laws include the FLSA, which requires employers,
inter alia, to pay employees a minimum wage and overtime pay and prohibits
child labor; 138 the FMLA, which requires some employers to provide jobprotected, unpaid leave for defined family or medical reasons; 139 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), which requires employers to
provide a safe and healthy environment by conforming to minimum
standards; 140 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which requires
employers that provide health and retirement plans to employees to follow
designated minimum standards; 141 and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, which requires large employers to notify employees before
closing the business or engaging in mass layoffs. 142 A labor standard may apply
to conduct for all employees (like the OSH Act) or only for a select group of
employees (like the FMLA). 143
Traditional employment discrimination laws include Title VII, which
prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin; 144 the ADEA,
which prohibits discrimination based on the age of an employee or applicant
who is at least forty years old; 145 and the ADA, which prohibits discrimination
based on the disability or perceived disability of an employee or applicant. 146
The development of disparate impact and mixed-motive theories has served to
strengthen the effectiveness of employment discrimination laws. Yet, these laws
are different from traditional labor standards because they also prohibit actions

138. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
140. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
141. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
142. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)); see also Evan
Hudson-Plush, Note, WARN’s Place in the FLSA/Employment Discrimination Dichotomy: Why A
Warning Cannot Be Waived, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2929, 2957–58 (2006) (explaining why WARN
is a labor standard, in comparison to the FLSA). See generally Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra
note 136; Corbett, supra note 136, at 130–31 (“Other examples include . . . the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act (EPPA), which prohibits employers from requiring employees to take polygraph
examinations, or from taking adverse employment actions based on the results, except under certain
circumstances”).
143. Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra note 136; see also Sachs, supra note 136, at 2701–02
(comparing labor standards to labor law’s collective rights approach).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp V 2012).
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motivated by an employee’s membership in a protected group or employment
policies that have a disparate impact on that group. 147
Some scholars designate accommodations as a distinct third category of
employment law. 148 Others classify accommodation provisions as a subset of
one of the other two categories of employment law or along with the other
employment law provisions with which they are affiliated. Following the latter
categorization, an accommodation provision may be a labor standard if it is
viewed as a separate, stand-alone protection, or it may be an employment
discrimination provision if Congress conferred the right to an accommodation
directly in a discrimination statute. An example of a labor standard
accommodation is found in USERRA, which requires employers to
accommodate a person who incurred or aggravated a disability while serving in
the military by making “reasonable efforts” to re-qualify the person for the
position to which he or she is entitled to return. 149 The failure to provide this
accommodation may be actionable. 150 An example of an employment
discrimination accommodation provision is found in the ADA, which defines
“discrimination,” in part, as the failure to make a reasonable accommodation to
an applicant or employee. 151 Additionally, an accommodation provision that is

147. Corbett, supra note 136, at 130–31; Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1818 (2005) (“[A]ntidiscrimination
jurisprudence . . . teaches that civil rights statutes are intended to punish bad actors instead of
directing defendant-employers to fix broader societal wrongs”); Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at
2952–58 (“A dichotomy thus exists between labor standard statutes that set minimum standards
and supersede contractual outcomes, and employment discrimination statutes which do not seek to
supplant private contractual outcomes, but to eliminate wrongful conduct and barriers to labor
market efficiency.”).
148. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1403–04
(2012); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 644–45
(2001); Roberts, supra note 5, at 1301; Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:
ADA Accommodations As Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 593 (2004).
149. 38 U.S.C. § 4313(b)(2)(B) (2006). According to USERRA, an employee
shall be promptly reemployed . . . (3) In the case of a person who has a disability incurred
in, or aggravated during, such service, and who (after reasonable efforts by the employer
to accommodate the disability) is not qualified due to such disability to be employed in
the position of employment in which the person would have been employed if the
continuous employment of such person with the employer had not been interrupted by
such service– (A) in any other position which is equivalent in seniority, status, and pay,
the duties of which the person is qualified to perform or would become qualified to
perform with reasonable efforts by the employer; or (B) . . . in a position which is the
nearest approximation to a position referred to in subparagraph (A) in terms of seniority,
status, and pay consistent with circumstances of such person’s case.
Id. § 4313(a)(3)(A)–(B).
150. See, e.g., Brown v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (“[T]he term ‘discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability’ includes- (5) (A) not making reasonable
accommodations . . . or (B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who
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an employment discrimination provision may also function like a traditional
labor standard or affirmative right. 152 Similarly, some laws contain components
of both labor standards and employment discrimination provisions. For
example, USERRA contains a labor standard that requires employers to provide
up to five years of job protection to certain workers and an employment
discrimination provision that prevents employers from taking employment
actions because of a worker’s membership in the military. 153
Classifying a provision as either a labor standard or an employment
discrimination provision is important because the theories underlying different
types of employment law vary. The main theories that have developed to defend
and explain employment law are: to regulate the employment relationship to
address imbalances of bargaining power, to address economic efficiency, and to
promote social equality. The theory that the government may regulate the
employment relationship to address imbalances of bargaining power between
employees and employers is often used to justify employment law, especially
labor standards. 154 This theory is most persuasive when considering laws that
require employers to undertake costs that have a broad impact, such as minimum
wage and overtime protections. Commentators have clarified that “[t]hese
minimum labor standard laws eliminate societal concerns from the competitive
process so that employers do not compete on these standards.” 155 As the Senate
similarly explained, “labor standards take broad societal concerns out of the
competitive process so that conscientious employers are not forced to compete
with unscrupulous employers.” 156 Additionally, labor standards are necessary
to maximize economic efficiency. 157 Indeed, some scholars argue that
individual employment law should be evaluated by its effect on the efficiency
of labor markets. 158
is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation . . . .”).
152. Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra note 136, at 24.
153. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (exemplifying a reemployment
provision), with 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006) (exemplifying an antidiscrimination provision).
154. See Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91, 111 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed.,
1997).
155. Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 2950, 2952 (making this observation with respect to the
FLSA and FMLA and explaining that the “fundamental difference is that labor standard
statutes . . . are meant to supercede private contractual outcomes, while employment discrimination
statutes are not meant to override private contracts, but to remedy a societal wrong”); see also
Corbett, supra note 136, at 128 (explaining that the FLSA “established minimum rights,” such as
“‘a minimum wage, a maximum number of hours before overtime was due, and minimum wages
for engaging in work and for certain types of work’”).
156. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7.
157. Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 106.
158. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Keith W. Chauvin, Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A
Framework for Analyzing Employment Law Issues, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 1, 4 (1999); Seth
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Conversely, the main theory justifying employment discrimination provisions
is the advancement of social equality by increased access to the workplace for
historically disadvantaged groups. 159 This theory posits that some employer
costs are justified to promote social equity. Historically, commentators have
defended employment discrimination provisions as a mechanism to address
systemic patterns of stigma and subordination by targeting a practice of
discrimination and occupational segregation that supports those patterns. 160
Under this theory, employment discrimination provisions and workplace
accommodations are necessary to overcome systemic patterns of stigma and
subordination.
Employment law scholars also debate whether accommodation and
employment discrimination provisions are distinct concepts. 161 Many scholars
argue that employment discrimination requirements and accommodation
mandates are different because employment discrimination provisions prohibit
employers from acting on prejudice, whereas accommodations prohibit
employers from acting on their desire to save money. 162 Others argue that the
ADA accommodation and antidiscrimination provisions are similar because
both seek “to overcome systemic patterns of stigma and subordination by
targeting a practice of occupational segregation that undergirds those
patterns.” 163 In this view, an accommodation is a discrimination requirement
with which “employers make individualized changes in facially neutral rules,
structures, or tasks to enable a protected class member to perform a given job
and produce as much output as non-accommodated coworkers.” 164
This theory is also used to justify Title VII and the expenses incurred by
employers subjected to them. 165 The legislative history of employment
discrimination statutes typically identifies the historical discrimination and
subordination of members of the targeted groups in society and at work, and
statistical and other documentation of the stigma and the long-term economic
impact of workplace exclusion and discrimination that contributed to

D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 19, 37 (2000).
159. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2003).
160. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 134, at 392.
161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 147 (highlighting the distinction between
antidiscrimination and accommodation approaches and observing that courts seem uncomfortable
with the accommodation approach).
163. Bagenstos, supra note 159, at 830.
164. Id. at 836.
165. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479, 2479–81 (1994); Befort, supra note 134, at 400.
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class-based inequality. 166
These statutes address systemic, class-based
subordination through the provision of accommodations and protections from
discrimination at work for groups who have experienced discrimination based
on membership in a protected category. Consequently, some scholars assess
Therefore,
their effectiveness in terms of achieving social equity. 167
accommodations may be a form of antidiscrimination requirements that
recognize that it is sometimes necessary to make structural changes to the
workplace to achieve the goal of overcoming past discriminatory animus
through meaningful inclusion.
Some scholars have postulated that this theory has two variations: the
difference model and the sameness model. The difference model of equality
posits that differential or preferential treatment may be necessary to ensure
equality; the sameness model of equality posits that employees should be treated
the same regardless of their membership in a protected class. 168 Title VII is an
example of an employment discrimination statute that attempts to address
historical societal discrimination by requiring employers to treat employees the
same regardless of gender, race, color, national origin, or religion. 169 The ADA
incorporates both a sameness model, by prohibiting covered employers from
treating individuals with disabilities differently from similarly situated
individuals, and a difference model, by providing preferential treatment in the
form of a reasonable accommodation. 170 The ADA represents both models,
recognizing that, in some instances, differential treatment of individuals with
disabilities is necessary to ensure equal opportunity and to address historical
barriers to access to the workplace. 171
Other approaches to employment discrimination law involve the application
of the antisubordination and anticlassification principles to constitutional equal
protection law. 172 The antisubordination theory asserts that social stratification

166. See Abrams, supra note 165, at 2479–81 (discussing the stigma and gender-based
discrimination that women may face in the workplace); Befort, supra note 134, at 365–66
(providing demographic data for workers in 1950).
167. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 134, at 458 (describing the narrow impact of the Equal Pay
Act); Abrams, supra note 165, at 2479–80 (describing Title VII and the theory of equality for
women in employment).
168. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1996).
169. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2004).
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Ball, supra note 173, at 955
(citing Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 168, at 10–11); see also Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
125 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the ADA contains “distinct” disparate
treatment and failure to provide reasonable accommodation claims).
171. Ball, supra note 173, at 955.
172. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Rights Tradition: Anticlassification
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 12 (2003).
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prevents true equality and that equal access to rights and privileges, such as
employment and employment discrimination law, should address social
stratification by providing protections to historically oppressed groups. 173 By
contrast, the anticlassification principle asserts that the government should not
classify individuals on the basis of group identification. 174 Both theories argue
that, historically, employment discrimination law was best explained by
antisubordination theory, but that the anticlassification principle more accurately
explains recent discrimination laws. 175
Finally, employment laws have also been used to challenge the male worker
norm by attempting to address the reality that the workplace remains designed
for male workers, as reflected in work hours, wages, structures, and other
disadvantages to caregivers, including breastfeeding mothers. 176
B. Analyzing the PPACA with a Labor Standard Lens
The PPACA contains elements of both labor standards and employment
discrimination provisions. Despite the incorporation of these concepts, the
PPACA cannot be justified by the employment law theories underlying
traditional labor standards; it simply does not fit within the economic efficiency
or regulation to address bargaining imbalances theories.
The PPACA’s breastfeeding provisions, placed in a federal healthcare law,
are intended to promote breastfeeding. The PPACA achieves this goal through
provisions that resemble labor standards. Requiring employers to comply with
some statutorily defined floor of rights involving the hours and location of work
is a classic labor standard provision.
Yet, the PPACA is different than most labor standards. One difference relates
to the small group of workers who are afforded these rights based on employee
choices: the choice to have children and the choice to breastfeed. Further, the
PPACA limits its protections to those in a strategically defined group. This is a
discrimination concept—not a labor standard concept. Indeed, “outside of the
antidiscrimination precinct, individual employment law does not protect
particular classes or axes of identity. Its protections are, in an important sense,

173. Id. at 9.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63
ALA. L. REV. 955, 975–76, 983–87 (2012) (arguing that recent changes to the ADA, Title VII, and
the enactment of the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act reflect a shift in statutory equality law toward
anticlassification values by emphasizing anticlassification provisions and deemphasizing certain
antisubordination provisions).
176. The “ideal worker” is a worker “who works full time and overtime and takes little or no
time off for childbearing or child rearing.” JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 1 (2000); see
also Robin R. Runge, Redefining Leave From Work, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 445,
445–47 (2012); Joan Williams, Market Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L.
REV. 305, 311–18 (1999).
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universal.” 177
Similarly, in some respects, employment discrimination
provisions are a type of traditional labor standard that relate to a protected
group. 178 Applying this principle to the PPACA moves the law outside of
traditional labor standard territory. At its core, the PPACA provisions only
apply to a particular type of worker: non-exempt breastfeeding mothers with
children under the age of one.
However, if the failure to provide universal coverage systematically precludes
a statute from qualifying as a labor standard, it would be problematic for the
FMLA, which is frequently used as one of the model labor standard statutes. 179
Although the groups covered by the FMLA are different than the group defined
in the PPACA, the FMLA contains its own, much-criticized eligibility
restrictions, such as the failure to cover small employers, part-time workers, or
most contingent workers (all of which are covered under the PPACA), as well
as the failure to provide wage replacement or coverage for caregiving
generally. 180 These limitations, including their disproportionate impact on
women, are the subject of continued debate. 181 Nonetheless, they cannot
automatically be the basis of classifying a law differently.
Moreover, the quintessential labor standards law—the FLSA—uses group
membership for certain protections. 182 While some of the FLSA’s protections
are universal (like the prohibition on using child labor or minimum wage
protections), 183 the FLSA also contains exemptions to the overtime provisions,
which have been expanded through regulatory interpretation over the years. 184
These exemptions exist because, in the 1930s, Congress observed that
employees who made a particular wage or had managerial experience had
different needs than those without these characteristics. 185 These are the very
177. Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 105.
178. See, e.g., Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra note 136 (noting that labor “standards may
serve as alternatives to nondiscrimination models, or nondiscrimination models might serve as
complements to or components of a labor standard.”).
179. See, e.g., id.; Corbett, supra note 136, at 130–31.
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A)–(B) (2006); see also Michelle A. Travis, What A Difference
A Day Makes, or Does It? Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1223, 1250–51 & n.155 (2010) (listing articles in which “scholars have criticized the FMLA for its
limited coverage on a variety of different grounds” that and summarizing their respective critiques
of these limitations).
181. See, e.g., Runge, supra note 176, at 449–50; Travis, supra note 180, at 1232–34.
182. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(1) (2006) (exempting some classes of employees from
benefiting from minimum wage and maximum hour requirements).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 212(a)–(b) (2006) (child labor); 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (minimum wage).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1–17); 29 C.F.R. § 541 (2013).
185. See Garrett Reid Krueger, Comment, Straight-Time Overtime and Salary Basis: Reform
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (1995); see also Hansen, supra
note 34, at 907 (observing that “women who are most vulnerable to loss of income, especially the
working poor, would be unable to afford unpaid breaks and might forego expressing milk”); Harry
G. Hutchison, Waging War on “Unemployables”? Race, Low-Wage Work, and Minimum Wages:
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same class-based exemptions that are incorporated into and limit the PPACA, 186
so they cannot be used as the basis for declaring that the PPACA is not a
traditional labor standard any more than they are used to declare that the FLSA
is not a traditional labor standard. However, the PPACA’s limitations go further
than the FLSA’s. Even with their coverage limitations, traditional labor
standards affect the entire workforce. The FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime
provisions apply to all employees who are non-exempt. Similarly, the FMLA
applies to all employees who experience serious health conditions or need to
care for a family member with one and then it has coverage limitations. The
PPACA provisions are different by requiring unpaid break time and a location
for a very small population of workers for a limited purpose and for a limited
time.
Accordingly, because the PPACA resembles a traditional labor standard,
while also looking like something else, it is helpful to examine the theories that
justify labor standards to determine whether the PPACA can be classified as a
labor standard. Arguably, the PPACA is designed to maximize economic
efficiency. Requiring employers to provide break time and a location to express
milk during work hours is economically efficient because it enables a segment
of the workforce to return to work after giving birth and maintain full-time
employment. Without the ability to express milk at work, many new mothers
are unable to return to the workforce. Losing these productive employees and
expending the costs to recruit, hire, and train new employees is not cost
efficient. 187 The PPACA responds to the failure of the free market and former
public policies to alter workplace structures to allow breastfeeding workers to
remain employed. In this way, the PPACA regulates the employment
relationship by providing standards and accommodations to improve retention
and lower turnover.
Similarly, the PPACA maximizes economic efficiency by providing an undue
hardship defense. The defense exempts small employers from the PPACA’s
break time and space requirements if they are unduly burdensome after
The New Evidence, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 46–47 (2011) (noting the FLSA’s “explicit
commitment to low-wage workers” and a potential antipoverty justification for the law).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 213. An effort is underway to make these protections less class-based by
expanding them to salaried workers. See Supporting Working Moms Act 2013, S. 934, 113th Cong.
(2013); Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, H.R. 1941, 113th Cong. (2013). One of the bill’s
sponsors estimates that this would “expand [the PPACA’s provisions] to cover approximately 12
million salaried women who work in traditional office environments.” Press Release, Senator Jeff
Merkley, supra note 114. There are also current proposals to create other protections to achieve
integration and attachment of working parents and pregnant working women, in particular. See,
e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 1975 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring employers to
provide the same types of accommodations for pregnant women as people with disabilities get
under the ADA); Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 942 113th Cong. (2013) (same).
187. See supra note 54 (summarizing the business case for breastfeeding-supportive
workplaces).
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consideration of the relevant cost, employer size, and efficiency. 188 However,
the limited scope of the PPACA significantly limits any possible economic
efficiency. Further, the potential economic advantage an employer otherwise
may gain is limited by the space requirement, the loss in productivity of an
employee during the time of expression, and her travel time to and from the
designated expression location.
However, the PPACA rectifies economic imbalances in the same way as the
FLSA. 189 The FLSA was meant “to correct and as rapidly as practicable to
eliminate” work “conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers.” 190 The sponsors of the PPACA used a similar rationale.
Specifically, members of Congress sought to advance the public health benefits
of mothers who breastfeed their children by ensuring that breastfeeding mothers
can express at work. 191 Moreover, the targeting of non-exempt employees also
indicates that the PPACA addresses imbalances of bargaining power between
low-income employees and their employers. However, the limited scope of the
PPACA’s labor standard weakens this argument.
The law’s ability to mitigate the imbalance of bargaining power between
employees and employers is also undercut by its failure to include a strong
enforcement mechanism. Both the government and individuals, through
litigation and other means, usually enforce traditional labor standards when
necessary. For example, employees who are denied FMLA leave have a private
right of action against their employers to seek redress and obtain relevant
remedies. 192 Similarly, the FLSA, the OSH Act, and USERRA all provide a
private right of action or an administrative complaint process through which
employees may enforce underlying substantive rights and obtain relevant
remedies. 193 Under USERRA, the Department created a national Ombudsman
Services Program through which a neutral and free mediator is available to assist
188. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (r)(3) (Supp. V 2012).
189. See Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 2952–58 & n. 173 (quoting Taylor v. Progress
Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 374–75 (4th Cir. 2005)) (justifying the FMLA’s minimum leave labor
standard because “labor standards are necessary . . . to relieve the competitive pressure placed on
responsible employers by employers who act irresponsibly”). But see Zatz, supra note 136, at 5
(criticizing the economic justification of the FLSA and reframing it as a discrimination law).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b) (2006); see Hutchison, supra note 185, at 46–47 (quoting Juan C.
Botero, The Regulation of Labor, 119 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1339, 1342 (2004)) (arguing that the
law may need to intervene “to protect the interests of workers and to help assure a minimum
standard of living . . . because ‘free labor markets are imperfect’ and provide an opportunity for
employers to extract rents by abusing workers, which is a source of ‘injustice and inefficiency.’”);
Krueger, supra note 189, at 1109.
191. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, supra note 114.
192. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a)(2) (2006).
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 217 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 660 (2006); 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322, 4323(a)
(2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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an employee in enforcing his rights or negotiating with his employer. 194 The
PPACA does not contain any of these enforcement mechanisms and relevant
remedies, which weakens its potential status as a labor standard. 195 Without an
effective enforcement mechanism and the availability of penalties, qualifying
workers are protected by nothing more than a symbolic statement of support.
Consequently, the PPACA fails as a labor standard.
C. Analyzing the PPACA with a Discrimination Law Lens
The PPACA does not fit as an employment discrimination law. Although the
PPACA may be a new type of antidiscrimination law that addresses social
inequity by targeting a class of workers without a shared immutable
characteristic or historical experience of workplace discrimination, it ultimately
fails because it does not contain any antidiscrimination protections and it
provides only defined, controlled accommodations to promote breastfeeding for
a small subset of the worker population for a limited time period.
The text of the PPACA explicitly fails to prohibit discrimination against
nursing workers; breastfeeding women are still not a protected class. Moreover,
the PPACA does not require that employers provide an affirmative reasonable
accommodation as developed under the ADA jurisprudence to meet the needs
of women who are nursing or breastfeeding. Rather, it requires employers to
provide unpaid break time for one specified purpose, thereby defining and
limiting what constitutes a “reasonable” accommodation for employers with at
least fifty employees. Also unlike the ADA, the failure to provide break time
and appropriate space is a violation of the PPACA, it is not a cognizable form
of discrimination against nursing workers.
Nonetheless, the statute does borrow concepts from employment
discrimination law. For example, the undue hardship defense for small
employers and the time and space labor standards can be framed as requirements
of structural equality. 196 The time and space requirements are affirmative
accommodations under which employers must change their structures to support
breastfeeding, similar to the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision. 197
Accordingly, some may argue that this is a stealth antidiscrimination law.
194. 38 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006); What is USERRA, ESGR, http://www.esgr.mil/USERRA/What
-is-USERRA.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
195. But see Andrews, supra note 129, at 137 (observing that the FLSA’s provision of
attorneys’ fees may incentivize litigation under this provision).
196. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implication, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5 (2000) (noting the “structural
equality” the ADA was designed to achieve).
197. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring employers to provide
reasonable break time and a location for nursing mothers to express breast milk), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(a) (2006) (defining the “reasonable accommodations” that employers must provide to
employees with disabilities).
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Yet, the PPACA does not provide a traditional accommodation because it is
not individualized (even if a woman is eligible for an accommodation because
she is part of a defined group). The only possible accommodation is break time
and a location to express. This is the strongest argument for declaring that the
PPACA is a labor standard. Employers need only make two defined
accommodations; accommodations need not be further tailored to the worker.
Time and space are it.
Moreover, the accommodation required by the PPACA is distinguishable
from the ADA’s accommodation in several key ways. First, the ADA
encourages the employer and the employee to define an accommodation that is
most appropriate for that individual. 198 Under the ADA, a request for a
reasonable accommodation by an individual is the beginning of an informal,
interactive process between an individual and an employer, which is used to
determine whether a particular accommodation is reasonable for the employee
and whether the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
employer. 199 The goal of this interactive process is to find an accommodation
that will enable the individual with a disability to perform essential job
functions. 200 This collaborative procedure is necessary because the ADA does
not define one specific accommodation. Instead, the law provides examples for
guidance, such as adjustments to the workplace, changes in work hours, or a
leave of absence. 201 In practice, the interactive process creates accommodations
beyond the provided examples. For example, different employees with the same
or similar disability may request different accommodations that meet their
individual needs.
Although the PPACA envisions that the employer and the employee will work
together to determine the frequency and length of breaks, they are not
encouraged to collaborate to create a different accommodation. The PPACA
allows for some individuality in the frequency and length of the breaks, and the
location may vary from employer to employer, but the employee cannot be
accommodated by being permitted to pump at home or to bring her child to work
to suckle during breaks, or by mandating day care.
The second key difference is that the ADA accommodation must be
reasonable and the employer must have the ability to implement it without
“undue hardship.” 202 The PPACA’s time and space accommodations are per se
reasonable for larger employers, but they may be an undue hardship for smaller
employers. In this respect, the same provision uses both a traditional labor
standard and an employment discrimination provision depending on the

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2013).
See id.
See id. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i)–(ii).
Id. § 1630.2(o)(4); see Bagenstos, supra note 159, at 836–37.
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employer. The time and space requirements are traditional labor standards that
must be provided if a nursing worker’s employer has at least fifty employees. 203
But the law contains an undue hardship affirmative defense, and the underlying
antidiscrimination justifications for it, if the nursing mother works for an
employer that employs fewer than fifty employees. 204
Arguably, the PPACA’s undue hardship defense represents the next evolution
of employment law. The fewer-than-fifty-employees requirement limits the
defense’s applicability while simultaneously establishing that there is no viable
defense for larger employers that fail to provide the required accommodations.
Using the number of employees as a proxy for assessing undue hardship is a
departure from the ADA and Title VII, which must be considered when applying
ADA and Title VII case law to the PPACA.
Even though these laws also contain an employee threshold requirement for
coverage, the ADA applies to all workers with disabilities, not just those with a
specific defined disability, and Title VII applies to all workers that are members
of the protected class, not just those that can be classified in one type of religion.
Because the PPACA contains semblances of employment discrimination
protections, the theories underlying discrimination law must be analyzed to
determine whether the PPACA is an employment discrimination law. The
PPACA accommodates a subgroup of individuals to promote breastfeeding
among that group. It also addresses a specific social inequality experienced by
a subset of new mothers who may be unable to continue working if their
employers do not accommodate their decision to breastfeed. The time and place
requirements increase the probability that this sub-group of working mothers
will remain in the workforce. However, the PPACA is not neutral. The
provisions do not provide systemic protection to all working mothers or all lowincome mothers, or all low-income mothers or all caregivers, nor does it protect
working mothers from discrimination, regardless of whether or not they
breastfeed. 205
Further, feminist scholars argue that ensuring inclusion of mothers in the
workforce, thereby addressing social inequalities, requires both accommodation

203. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1), (3) (Supp. V 2012).
204. Id. § 207(r)(3).
205. See Zatz, supra note 136, at 23, 32 (citing Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in
American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003);
Athena D. Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of
Economic Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859 (2008)) (raising concerns about class-based
employment law, in part based on the “traditional hostility to class analysis”); see also Hansen,
supra note 34, at 893–95 (describing the creation of and potential impact of a “two-tier system” of
addressing breastfeeding based on class); Runge, supra note 176, at 470–73 (noting that the law
does not address the documented discrimination experienced by women as caregivers).
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of pregnancy and prohibition of pregnancy-based discrimination. 206 This
requires recognition that sex-based segregation begins with pregnancy, but
continues through child bearing. 207 Without accommodation, pregnancy causes
women to temporarily, or even permanently leave the workforce, contributing
to subordination of women in the workplace and the wage gap. 208 Failure to
accommodate pregnancy and child rearing limits working mothers’ abilities to
amass the skills, expertise, and seniority necessary to progress in or pursue their
careers. Scholars and advocates criticize the PDA for wrongly assuming that
intentional discrimination is the primary barrier facing working women who
choose to have children. 209 Instead, advocates argue that effective workplace
laws must require employers to accommodate women during both pregnancy
and afterward to enable them to retain and flourish in their employment. 210
By providing an accommodation for breastfeeding workers to express at work,
it could be argued that the PPACA attempts to address the sex-based
discrimination experienced by working women who are pregnant or mothers.
The PPACA provides the accommodation to minimize absence from the
workplace that the PDA does not 211 by enabling breastfeeding mothers to return
to work after giving birth. However, the PPACA does not provide maternity
leave, nor does it accommodate all pregnant workers. Rather, it provides a
workplace accommodation for mothers who choose to breastfeed for a limited
time, not for all new mothers, and not for pregnancy or caregiving generally.
Congress could have created a set of provisions to address systemic
discrimination. It could have required employers to provide daycare centers,
paid parental leave, control over break time to all workers, or traditional
antidiscrimination protection. The PPACA’s approach is unique because it
carves out a sub-group from a class of individuals that has experienced
discrimination and provides it with accommodations that resemble traditional
labor standards. Additionally, the law defines membership in the protected class
by voluntary, individual actions: the decisions to have children, to breastfeed,
and to work. By ensuring that mothers who breastfeed will not be fired for doing
so, the law elevates this group of mothers above others. A situation may arise
in which an employer discriminates against a mother who has chosen not to
breastfeed, while a mother in the same workplace who exercises her right to take
206. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2155 (1994).
207. Id. at 2155.
208. Id. at 2156; Dina Bakst, Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012,
at A25.
209. See, e.g., Heather Boushey, The Role of the Government in Work-Family Conflict,
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall 2011, at 163, 171 (critiquing the PDA’s failure to require affirmative
steps by employers).
210. See, e.g., Bakst, supra note 208.
211. See supra note 62. But see Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 2968 (“Employment
discrimination statutes set no such floor; they simply seek to remedy an inefficient social evil that
exists in the workplace.”).
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breaks to breastfeed is protected. Separating this class of workers by individual
choices they make about how to nourish their children will not improve
workplace opportunities for all mothers or all caregivers. It may, however,
achieve its public health goal of promoting breastfeeding.
The PPACA as enacted did not amend Title VII, which might have integrated
working mothers into the workforce more effectively. Rather, the PPACA is a
piecemeal approach, both in the protections it provides (accommodations
without employment discrimination protections for a limited period of time) and
the group of individuals that it protects (new mothers who choose and are able
to breastfeed for up to a year). Essentially, the PPACA defines a new class that
deserves workplace protection: breastfeeding mothers. However, it is difficult
to argue that breastfeeding mothers as a group have experienced unique systemic
discrimination that warrants accommodation.
Nonetheless, many of the bills proposed before the PPACA contained
employment discrimination protections. 212 Some members of Congress believe
that without clear protection, nursing workers will continue to experience
discrimination without sufficient recourse. 213 Consequently, calls to create this
new class of protected workers continue. 214
In sum, the PPACA was not designed to address social inequity by
accommodating sub-groups of classes of individuals who have historically
experienced workplace discrimination. Rather, it is a law intended to promote
the specific act of breastfeeding, but also may address some aspect of
discrimination against low-income working mothers. By targeting a narrowly
defined sub-group with accommodations to promote a specific behavior, the
212. See supra Part I.C.
213. For example, Senator Merkley, one the PPACA’s sponsors, expressed concern with the
outcome of a state case that failed to offer antidiscrimination protection to nursing workers. See
Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 623 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting a claim
brought by a nursing woman who was fired for unauthorized breaks she took to breastfeed,
allegedly in violation of her company’s policy, fails because her failure to follow directions was
not a pretext for pregnancy discrimination); see also LaNisa Allen, Comment on the Wage and
Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1715 (stating
that she was fired for using a restroom break to pump her milk because it was becoming
uncomfortable for her to keep working without doing so). Senator Merkley highlighted the result
in Allen while Congress debated the PPACA. Senator Jeff Merkley, Why We Must Stand Up for
the Right to Breastfeed, MOMSRISING.ORG (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.momsrising.org/blog/why
-we-must-standup-for-the-right-to-breastfeed/ (“This ruling . . . reaffirms why it’s important that
Congress include [the lactation provisions] in the health reform legislation.”).
214. See, e.g., Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, H.R. 1941, 113th Cong. (2013)
(proposing to further amend the FLSA to extend the break time and space requirements for milk
expression to exempt employees); Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, S. 934, 113th Cong.
(2013) (same); Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2011, H.R. 2758, 112th Cong. § 102 (2011)
(proposing to define “because of sex” to include actions taken on the basis of lactation for Title VII
purposes); Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2011, S. 1463, 112th Cong. § 102 (2011) (same).
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PPACA fails to achieve the goal of employment discrimination law, which is to
effectively address systemic social inequality.
IV. REJECTION OF THE PPACA’S PIECEMEAL PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO
EMPLOYMENT LAW
The lactation provisions of the PPACA fit within the existing employment
law that addresses social inequality through traditional labor standards and
protections that increase access to the workplace for protected groups.
Specifically, these provisions attempt to increase access to the workplace for
low-income breastfeeding mothers who are hourly workers by providing unpaid
time and a location to pump milk at work. In theory, these protections enable
these women to avoid being forced either to stop breastfeeding or to quit their
jobs. Instead, they can continue breastfeeding and remain employed. Consistent
with this theory is the reality that neither other federal and state laws nor most
employers otherwise provide this type of leave. 215 In this respect, the underlying
goal of the PPACA is laudable, especially in light of the political compromises
that are often necessary to pass a new labor standard or employment
discrimination provision. 216 However, the statute does not go far enough and
consequently fails to fully achieve its goal.
First, a public health law that offers a symbolic piecemeal approach may not
be the best way to effectively promote individual rights or better conditions at
work. This problem, along with others that intersect with it, needs more than a
statute that essentially provides only a congressional statement of support that
employers should provide protections, support employees who choose to
breastfeed, and help the government meet a public health goal. By providing
standard-like rights without an employment discrimination protection or
effective enforcement mechanism, the statute does not provide sufficient
protections. The employee may only file a complaint with the Department if the
employer denies or fails to provide the unpaid break time or location, and her
potential damages are significantly limited. 217 Consequently, the same group of
women who are meant to benefit from the statute may be discriminated against
because of their status as nursing mothers, without effective recourse. The
limited scope of protections and damages make it even harder for her to find a
lawyer who would be willing to represent a nursing mother in any claims under
the PPACA against her employer. 218
215. Runge, supra note 176, at 472; see Breastfeeding Laws, supra note 65 (summarizing
existing state laws that support breastfeeding).
216. See generally Chai R. Felblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace
Flexibility, in WORK-LIFE POLICIES 251–78 (Ann C. Crouter & Alan Booth eds., 2009) (describing
the political atmosphere around consideration of additional legislative proposals for new
employment laws).
217. See Andrews, supra note 129, at 137–38.
218. Sharon M. Dietrich, When Working Isn’t Enough: Low-Wage Workers Struggle to
Survive, 6 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 613, 623–24 (2004).
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Second, by only providing protection for the act of pumping milk, low-income
working mothers may still be discriminated against for any other characteristic
related to nursing or child care. For example, if her employer perceives that she
is taking too many calls from a child care provider with questions about her
child, or that she is leaving too early because she needs to pick up her child from
child care, or someone brings her child to her for suckling, she may be harassed
or even fired, with limited recourse.
Moreover, although the PPACA purports to protect low-income women by
limiting the accommodation to hourly workers, it fails to protect them because
the break time for pumping milk is unpaid. This is an inherent disincentive for
workers. Further, given that the number of breaks and the location for pumping
at the workplace is negotiable, the unequal bargaining power between an hourly
worker and her boss, as well as the seemingly sexual nature—to some—of the
language that necessarily must be used to ask for breastfeeding protections, 219
will discourage workers from asking for the necessary number of breaks or the
appropriate space, for fear of angering their boss and/or being fired. Hourly
workers are almost exclusively at will, and they often live paycheck to paycheck,
especially after a child is born and there are new expenses. 220 To require an
employee to take unpaid time to breastfeed at work and then to negotiate that
time may be enough to cause some workers to stop breastfeeding rather than lose
the income from their jobs or risk being perceived as a problem at work.
Finally, many low-income women do not return to work after the birth of a
child because the cost of child care exceeds their hourly wage or salary. 221 The
PPACA does not address this problem. Some of the alternative solutions, if the
goal is to ensure access to the workplace for low-income breastfeeding mothers,
are to require employers to provide day care, pay for day care while the mother
is breastfeeding, or provide paid parental leave.

219. See supra notes 39, 43, 44–49 and accompanying text (describing some of the harassment
and embarrassment concerns nursing workers have or have experienced with breastfeeding at
work).
220. See Dietrich, supra note 219, at 617 (discussing the connection between hourly work and
poverty and noting that low-income workers may be vulnerable to abuse); see also MARK LINO,
CTR. FOR NUTRITION AND PROMOTION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, EXPENDITURES ON
CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2012 21 (2013), available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications
/CRC/crc2012.pdf (including USDA’s estimate for annual expenditures for the first year of a child
born in 2012 to range from $9520-21,530 depending on income level); Stephanie Bornstein, Work,
Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 42
(observing that the low-income families “may be one paycheck away from homelessness”).
221. See Bornstein, supra note 221, at 7–8 (summarizing why childcare is often inaccessible
for low-income workers); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom:
Low-Income Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1029 (2004); Alissa Quart, Crushed By the Cost of Child Care, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2013,
at SR4.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the creation of a new type of employment law by
examining the breastfeeding at work provisions enacted in section 4207 of the
PPACA. On its face, section 4207 resembles other federal employment
provisions given its shared roots and use of concepts from traditional labor
standards and employment discrimination provisions. However, upon closer
examination, the combination of rights to break time and space to express milk
at work, as well as the limitations on whether all employers must provide them,
who is eligible to use them, and how an employee might enforce them or
penalize an employer for violating them, are unique. Despite the incorporation
of an undue hardship defense for small employers, there is no traditional
antidiscrimination provision in the PPACA, and any claim that the law is aimed
at addressing historical systemic discrimination against breastfeeding women is
weak, at best. The sole goal of this law is to promote a specific type of
breastfeeding by non-exempt working mothers to ensure that these women can
breastfeed, including participating in the activity outside of work. These limited
labor standard-like provisions, in the form of time and space accommodationlike requirements, for such a small subset of working mothers for a limited time
represents a dangerous turn away from traditional efforts to use federal
employment law to effectively address the broader goal of increasing access to
the workplace for women and low-income workers.

